Within Reason

[This post is a continuation of Kantopias, Part 1]

So before we look at the details of these Kantopias, there is one last thing that Kant could have said in the third formulation of the Categorical Imperative, and didn’t. He could have argued that we should “act in accordance with universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends”. Such a formulation would suggest that we should obey the kind of laws the people of such a kingdom would enact. And certainly we should, but it’s central to Kant’s project that we do not merely follow the laws of morality, but we “construct” them or give them to ourselves.

If the first two formulations make it feel like we might be held hostage to universal laws, or the law to treat others as ends, the third formulation makes it clear that we must be in the driver’s seat of morality. Fortunately, this doesn’t mean that anything goes. Rather, the only laws we can fully and freely give to our rational selves are those of morality — those that others could consistently give to themselves and others as well. In addition, the idea that we give *ourselves* laws to follow as opposed to following the laws of nature (Aristotle, Hume, and others) or God (Christianity) makes it plausible that the will is acting freely. To be moral is to be rational is to be free.

But what does a kingdom of rational, moral, free individuals look like?

Figuring out the answer to this question is one of the reasons I went from being a casual admirer of Kantian ethics to an avid supporter. The answer turns out to be that a kingdom of ends is going to look like, well, many different things. The categorical imperative forbids acting on any maxim that cannot be willed to be a universal law. But otherwise, it is completely silent on what ends you should have. All kinds of different “Kantopian” societies are going to be possible. The substance of these societies will be determined by the very different constitutions of the people who make them up and their own particular sets of ends.

Think of a society which, for whatever reason, had a very low tolerance for being in groups. Maybe if they worked really hard, they could be happier in groups, but basically being alone gave them a good amount of pleasure. Such a society could easily be a kingdom of ends as long they all made the categorical imperative their preeminent moral principle. While it would have to have a certain level of altruism, the society would basically be a land of very respectful hermits. A society with different psychological traits, say one that had a very low tolerance for being alone, could also be a kingdom of ends. I would expect such a society to have a much higher level of altruism than the categorical imperative required. A Kantopia could thus also be a place filled with respectful, fun-loving socialites.

In the end there will be many different kinds of kingdoms of ends because the silence of the categorical imperative on many of our ends allows freedom to take many shapes. Different sets of natural or learned inclinations will lead to dramatically different, respectful societies. I haven’t thought too hard about this, but I wouldn’t be surprised if both capitalist and socialist Kantopias were possible. Again, this would depend on the natural levels of self-interest that emerge from people’s natures and upbringings.

So the third formulation seems to lead us naturally to the idea that, for large groups of people, freedom can take many shapes and free societies can have remarkably different structures and sets of social relationships. With the dissonant, disagreeable ends ruled out, the remaining ends people have will have a kind of harmony. That said, the “harmony” of ends shouldn’t be confused with a “union” of ends.

One final thing to note about the contrast between Kantian ethics and other moral theories here is that it’s not altogether clear that certain forms of consequentialism (like hedonistic utilitarianism) will be able to remain silent on what ends people need to have. Certainly, if having unified ends would make a society happier, moving to unify ends might make the society morally better. For Kantopias, the fact that a certain society has more aggregate happiness does not make it morally better. People can pursue hedonistic ends, so long as they do not conflict with others’ ends, but happiness or pleasure is just one end amongst many. So the society of hermits I noted earlier might have much more work to do if utilitarianism is true; but on a Kantian ethic, it can’t really get better morally.

My audience will almost certainly want to ask how this compares to what virtue ethics might prescribe for a society. I don’t think I can answer this without differentiating between many different types of virtue ethics. But while virtue ethics certainly doesn’t seem as possibly prescriptive about ends as consequentialism, I get the impression that perhaps it isn’t quite as silent about them as Kantian ethics has to be. In particular, depending on how “social” a thing virtue is, an ideally virtuous society might be more likely to prescribe certain social ends.

So are Kantopias utopian? Maybe not if one’s criterion for a utopia is that the citizens be blissfully happy. But if mutual respect for each others’ ends–even ends very different than one’s own–is your idea of about as good as a society can get, then you might want to take a closer look at the third formulation of the categorical imperative.