Within Reason

So this is the first post in a series on Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. I’m stealing Chris’s abbrevation for it: GMOM. Phonetically, it’s not a bad way to think about Kant’s Ethics (“Gee Mom, should I tell the truth even to an axe murderer looking for my friend?”). As a bit of background, I’m reading the new Cambridge edition of Kant’s works and the particular translation is Mary Gregory’s. There is a system of numbering in the text that I’m taking to be a standard, though I don’t see it explained in the front matter. The argument here is from 4:393, or about the second page in the Groundwork. One does need to know Kant’s definition of complete happiness, which is our concept of what it would be for all our desires (Kant calls them inclinations) to be satisfied.

When I’d read this argument in the text before I was a little embarrassed about it, thinking Kant was simply making an argument that we are perfectly adapted beings, and since we have reason, it must be good for us in some way. I now think there is a lot more going on than that and that it actually serves as a definitive statement of what kind of beings Kant’s ethics really apply to.

I’m summing it up like this:

1. In a being that is constituted purposively for life, we will find only instruments that are best adapted and appropriate to that end and no instruments for some other end.
2. Reason is not an instrument best adapted and appropriate to preservation of life.
3. Instinct is an instrument best adapted and appropriate to the preservation of life.
4. Thus a being that has both instinct and reason and is constituted to preserve its life, reason could serve at best as something to contemplate one’s fortunate possession of instinct.
5. Such a being would be constituted in such a way that reason had no practical use.
6. Reason would not only have been barred from producing preservation, but nature would have also elected for instinct to be the route to happiness.
7. But we find that reason does have a practical use, and in fact can be misleadingly used to try to further happiness (see definition above).
8. Thus, we are not beings only constituted purposively for life and must have a different purpose.

Kant’s idea of our purpose is, as he writes at 4:396, to produce a good will, that is, to live a life of morality.

So the argument above, which I had always take to be an anti-Darwinian claim about the adaptedness of certain parts and faculties, really only insists that true perfect adaptedness would be true of beings only constituted solely for preserving their lives. Reproduction is left out of this equation, which means that it might not be all that unreasonable of an argument for beings of the kind Kant is describing: beings streamlined for just life. Not that there are any such beings, but it’s not unreasonable to think some kind of selection could streamline a being in such a case. At any rate, whether Kant is compatible with natural selection is somewhat beside the point. This argument is actually about the purpose of human living. Even though we can live just to preserve our lives or just for happiness, this is selling ourselves short, and makes us see reason as an encumbrance. We have one too many talents to quest only after happiness, the way a fancy gas range with all the bells and whistles would be a bit much just to boil water for pasta (even if you really liked pasta).

Kant goes on to argue that not only do we find ourselves with reason that has a practical use, but that using it to try to ensure one’s happiness often lands one in a degree of “misology” or hatred of reason. I don’t know exactly what to say about this latter point. It certainly seems true that beings with reason could be better suited for planning and thus in a better position to take care of their long-term interests, which could translate into greater happiness in the future.

We are beings that adapt, though, and reaching a certain level of happiness is often only the invitation to setting some yet higher standard (dial-up internet made some of us very happy until broadband came along). So maybe Kant is right, but just for beings with any sense of drive and progress. In fact, perhaps this could be seen as one of his fundamental assumptions: that he is only talking about people with relatively complex psychologies who are not satisfied with a small, fixed set of desires. This ties into his definition of happiness, for if we do keep our set of desires fixed and small, it would be—in principle—possible for us to be completely happy.

Behind the scenes, then, Kant appears to be offering us a choice: happiness if you want to be simple (more or less a well adapted animal), or morality through pure practical reason if you want to enjoy all that humanity has to offer. But complete satisfaction of desires using reason is only a fool’s errand if you want to lead a life of even moderate complexity. People who attempt such a combination will come to hate reason and long for a simpler life which they may not have the nature to achieve.

Luckily, the more complex life has a supreme purpose all its own.