My apologies for the short hiatus. It was Homecoming weekend here at UMR (come to think of it, the last one at UMR) and there were many and various events and dinners to attend. But now back to our (non-computer related) regular programming. This post is about what Kant calls his “second proposition” in the first section of the Groundwork. It’s an important one, as it’s about where we meet the concept of a “maxim” in Kant’s ethics. And really, Kant’s ethics without maxims wouldn’t be much at all.
> Kant’s second proposition: an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and thus does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action, but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance within which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.
This is a bit of a difficult principle to parse. At first, it looks like a simple declaration that the results of one’s actions don’t matter as much as our intentions, or why we do something. This would be what someone reading Kant as a non-utilitarian might focus on. But that’s not quite right. Kant isn’t yet talking about the effects of our actions (which are the main interest of a utilitarian). Rather, he’s talking about those effects considered as ends. So he’s saying that even the effects we *intend* to bring about don’t give our actions moral worth. This can seem very odd at first, because so many of the things we do are focused on bringing about certain effects in the near or far future. I read the book because I want to see what happens at the end. I comfort my grieving friend because I want him to feel better. In fact, life is dominated by these kinds of motivators for actions. Again, there is nothing *wrong* about acting on such motives. They’re simply non-moral actions done from non-moral reasons. What Kant is suggesting is that there is another kind of entity in decision-making, namely a maxim or a principle, and it is only acting from a principle that gives an action moral worth.
It’s probably good to start then by asking why in the world Kant would be arguing that even our *intentions* don’t matter. But really this is fairly simple. Our intentions are usually based upon our inclinations, which Kant (as I’ve tried to show in earlier posts) has good reason to suppose don’t have moral worth. Look at the intentions I listed above: “I comfort my grieving friend because I want him to feel better”. This need not be my fault at all, and thus may not be the product of Kant’s source of unconditional worth: the good will. It may just be that nature, via my parents, has made me into a sympathetic guy. This is the kind of purpose Kant intends to show having no moral worth. The good will is an altogether different kind of law than the laws of nature, and it’s mine. As Kant says later in the paragraph explaining the proposition:
> For, the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads…
The good will, then is uniquely situated in human beings with their ties to the natural world. A “holy will”, as Kant calls it later, would be one that was not at all pulled by subjective desires, but only by something else. Being caught in between the two worlds also is what makes us feel morality as *normative* or something we *ought* to do as opposed to something we simply do. God, or the holy will, on Kant’s theory, would have not feel tempted by worldly desire to do the wrong thing.
So take out the reference to purposes and we have Kant’s positive proposition about wherein moral worth lies:
> Kant’s simplified second proposition: an action done from duty has its moral worth in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon.
or, without referring to maxims,
> An action done from duty has its moral worth in virtue of the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done.
I think it’s easiest to think of maxims in terms of principles. So when mere principle moves the will, then an action has moral worth. I think this is important to note, because many people (including past versions of myself) get it wrong about what a maxim contains. A maxim isn’t a statement of the form: “I will do x in order to bring about y” but rather, “When I am in y circumstances, I will do x.” Instead of “I comfort my grieving friend because I want him to feel better”, a morally worthy maxim would be “When friends are grieving, I should comfort them” or, more simply, “One comforts grieving friends”.
Now my way of explicating Kant here does run into some minor problems with his suicide example later on, but I think that can be explained by noting that Kant is still somewhat ambiguous here between the concepts of “lacking moral worth” and “having a wrongful principle”. This also spotlights one thing that Kant doesn’t talk enough about here: bad principles. What really matters here, though, is that maxims (or principles) are importantly different than inclinations. As Kant will later say, they are subjective counterparts of the moral law.
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